ACCESS TO COURT FILES
© Kenneth W. Singer 1999
David F. Sutherland & Associates
Vancouver, BC
kws@dfsutherland.com

 
"Access to pretrial documents furthers the same societal needs served by open trials and pretrial civil and criminal proceedings. Court officials can be better evaluated when their actions are seen by informed, rather than merely curious, spectators."

[Anne Elizabeth Cohen, "Access to Pre Trial Documents Under the First Amendment" (1984), 84 Colum.L. Rev. 1813, at p. 1827.]

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the best potential sources of information for journalists regarding matters before the courts are the court
files themselves. The problem is that, despite the principle of "openness" lauded in case after case, access to court files is often limited, either by statute or administrative "policy," to the lawyers, the parties involved and court staff. This paper will provide a brief overview of four major areas in respect of access to court files: access to search warrants, access to adult criminal files, access to family law files, and access to exhibits.

II. ACCESS TO SEARCH WARRANTS

The issue of whether the public is entitled to inspect search warrants and the informations used to obtain them was dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney-General of Nova Scotia et al. v. MacIntyre.

In MacIntyre the Court laid down guidelines with respect to accessibility of search warrants and informations based on a number of policy considerations. The policy considerations included respect for the privacy of the individual, protection of the administration of justice, implementation of the will of Parliament that a search warrant be an effective aid in the investigation of crime, and the public’s interest in favour of openness in respect of judicial acts.

Based on the aforementioned considerations, the Court in MacIntyre held that the public was not entitled to be
present at the time a search warrant is issued because of a concern that the effective administration of justice
would be frustrated, in part by the possibility that the person whose premises were to be searched would be
forewarned. The Court also accepted that where a search warrant is issued and executed but nothing is found
protection of the innocent from unnecessary harm outweighed the public access interest. However, a majority of the Court ruled that once a search warrant has been issued and executed resulting in objects being found a member of the public was entitled to inspect a warrant and the information upon which it was issued unless some overriding interest required that access continue to be denied.

Regarding the issue of jurisdiction, the Court in MacIntyre held (at p. 405) that a publication ban could be granted pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction over its own process: "Undoubtedly every Court has a supervisory and protecting power over its own records. Access can be denied when the ends of justice would be subverted by disclosure or the judicial documents might be used for an improper purpose."

This power was qualified in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. In Dagenais the Supreme Court of Canada held that the discretionary power to limit publication, whether statutory or inherent, had to be exercised in accordance with the principles set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Since a publication ban, by definition, involves a s.2(b) infringement of the right to free speech, such bans had to be justified on the basis of competing and equally valid policy objectives. In Dagenais the Court said (at p. 38) that a publication ban should only be order when :

a.    such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because   reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and,
b.    the salutary effects of the publication outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban.
If the ban fails to meet this standard, then the judge making the order has committed an error of law. Generally
speaking, courts will favour publication bans in respect of search warrant materials over freedom of the press in order to ensure that an accused’s right to a fair trial is not infringed [see for example B.C. (A.G.) v. Pac. Press
Ltd.].

Courts also consider the potential negative impact on third parties if a publication ban is not ordered in respect of a search warrant.

Generally speaking, such bans are usually lifted once the accused elects to be tried by judge alone, or once the jury is sequestered or begins its deliberations.

III. ACCESS TO CRIMINAL FILES

For the most part, adult criminal files are only open to inspection by the accused, his or her counsel, crown counsel assigned to that case, and anyone preparing a pre-sentence report at the request of the Court. There are exceptions.

In British Columbia, for example, a recent Practice Direction dated November 2, 1998 has clarified the exceptions, at least with respect to criminal matters before that province’s Supreme Court. Specifically, members of the public (which, of course, includes the media) have unrestricted access to Informations and Indictments when proffered and Reasons for Judgment. The public may also have access to search warrants and informations to obtain them where the search warrant has been executed, something has been seized, no claims for solicitor-client privilege or other statutory restrictions are involved, and a sealing order has not been made (see above). Interestingly, the Practice Direction specifically states that search warrants and informations to obtain them, if not issued under the Criminal Code or the Income Tax Act, are available for inspection even if nothing was seized, as long as no sealing order has been made.

The validity of a similar Practice Direction was discussed in the 1995 B.C. case of Forfeiture of Monies seized at the Pacific Highway Canada Customs Office (Re). In that case newspapers sought access to the court’s file to use affidavit material, namely those of investigating police officers, in their stories. In granting access, the Court had the opportunity to comment on a submission by one of the media applicants to the effect that the Practice Direction infringed s. 2(b) of the Charter. According to Mr. Justice Thackery (at paras. 37 - 38):

          " With respect, the Direction does not deny access to the vast majority of documents.  It provides a
          straight- forward procedure to enable the court to discharge its obligation to exercise what Dickson J.
          in MacIntyre at p. 405 describes as a "supervisory and protecting power over its own records."  It
          provides for unrestricted access to informations, indictments and reasons for judgment and for access
          to search warrants in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 and, in all other cases, for an informal
          written request to the trial judge or the Chief Justice through the registry. The request is often granted
          at that point without anything further.  If it is not clear that the request would not affect anyone’s
          legitimate interest, notice may have to be given to Crown counsel, the accused, or others who may be
          affected.  In the few cases where there remains an issue, an application involving a hearing may be
          required.

          The submission that the Practice Direction is "over-inclusive and invalid" is not, in my opinion, a viable
          argument.  The Practice Direction does not violate any principle of common law.  Nor does it curtail
          public access to the records of the judicial process to the extent that any case can be made out of a
          Charter violation."

With respect to matters in B.C. Provincial Court, the Ministry of the Attorney-General has issued a "Court
Services Circular" [CRMC 3/94] which outlines the general policy to be followed by court staff with respect to
document disclosure. The validity of this circular, as will be discussed below, is questionable. In any event, the
circular purports to be a "quick reference for court staff which can provide guidance for situations where caution must be exercised…." It does not apply to Youth Court or Supreme Court matters. Subject to exceptions the policy states that the public and the media should be given access to the following information in criminal matters in Provincial Court:

        a.name of accused (unless prohibited by court order);
        b.specific charges or proceedings contained in the Information;
        c.notice of appeal;
        d.information concerning adjournment dates;
        e.the final disposition;
        f.reasons for judgment, if on file, and not restricted by court order or otherwise.

The public or the media are also given access to the:

        a.Record of Proceedings;
        b.Case History Card;
        c.Adjournment Minutes Sheet (automated registries).

The circular then goes on to list all the documents that have restricted access. Such restricted documents include applications for wire-taps (no access – s. 187 Criminal Code), the accused’s criminal record (access only to Crown counsel, defence counsel, accused and probation officer concerned with the case), and medical reports (access only to Crown counsel, accused, defence counsel and the probation officer assigned to the matter, unless otherwise ordered by the Court).

The validity of CRMC 3/94, however, was brought into question in the case of R. v. John. In John a local reporter asked for access to a transcript of a tape recorded statement given by the accused in order to confirm the statements attributed to the accused. Although the tape recording was played in court in the presence of the reporter he had some difficulty hearing what was said and was concerned about relying on his notes. Upon his
request the Court’s attention was drawn to the aforementioned policy circular. Specifically, the Court focused on the restriction regarding exhibits which limited access to Crown counsel, defence counsel and accused, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court. In addition, exhibits could only be viewed while under the supervision of registry personnel. In finding the policy of no force and effect, Judge Saunderson referred to the restriction regarding
exhibits and stated as follows (at p. 8):

          "That statement reverses the presumption of openness of the courts and access by the public and the
          media to evidence. Clearly, there must be some control and protection of exhibits and therefore
          members of the public and the media will have to make arrangements with the court staff if they wish to
          view certain types of exhibits, for example, firearms, narcotics and other objects. I do not regard a
          written exhibit as an object.

          To the extent that this Court Services circular reverses the burden in respect of access to the
          information in question, namely copies of written exhibits, it, in my view, is of no force and effect
          whatsoever and the court staff ought not to be guided by it. If the Attorney General wishes to take
          issue with that, he can do so. Presumably now it will be in another court."

As a result, Judge Saunderson granted the reporter’s request and provided him with a copy of the transcript of the tape recording.

Another problem with CRMC 3/94 is that it is woefully out-of-date, owing to changes in the names of some court documents. Although it continues in effect, a re-working of the entire BC Criminal Case Processing Manual is
underway. It is expected that changes will include a new chapter dealing with access issues.

Regarding Youth Court matters, the general rule (as noted in CRMC 3/94) is that nothing can be disclosed or
released which connects the young person to the offence. While court lists may contain the young person’s name, they cannot reveal the charge. In addition, the Young Offenders Act stipulates that access to youth court
documents is given to the youth, probation officer, defence counsel, Crown counsel, parent or adult assisting the youth, or the person specified in a court order or in s. 44.1 of the Young Offenders Act as restricted by s. 45.

IV. ACCESS TO FAMILY LAW FILES

It has long been recognized that court files in divorce and other family law proceedings require special protection.  The various jurisdictions have, therefore, established rules regarding disclosure and access in family matters before the courts. For example, Rule 60(41) of the B.C. Rules of Court states:

          "Unless the court otherwise orders, no person, other than a solicitor, a party or a person authorized by
          a party or by a party’s solicitor, may search a registry file in respect of a proceeding brought under the
          Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), the Family Relations
          Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128, or the Child, Family and Community Services Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46."

Of note, Reasons for Judgment are not considered part of the court file, even though a copy may be kept there, and are therefore available to the public and the media, usually upon payment of a fee.

Some of the rules restricting access to family court files, however, have been brought into question. For example, in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney-General) the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a section of the Alberta Judicature Act which had placed substantial restrictions upon access to family law proceedings and files, and upon the right to publish details of those proceedings and files. The majority of the Court held that openness was to be the rule in these matters, but that this rule was subject to exceptions, including the need for protection of privacy of witnesses or children. According to Mr. Justice Cory (at p. 617) "there can be no doubt that in order to ensure a fair trial and to protect privacy interests, the court can always use its supervisory power over its own record to grant restraining orders in appropriate cases."

An interesting case in this regard is the B.C. case of Pacific Press Ltd. v. Vickers & Palmer. In Vickers the Court ordered a family file unsealed but placed restrictions on the publication of certain information. The Court’s reasoning was summarized in the headnote (at p. 92) as follows:

          "The right of the public to know about the conduct of the government in matters of custody takes
          precedence over the interest of the infant in his or her privacy, particularly where the matter in
          question has been completed. The court file was ordered unsealed. However, to protect the privacy of
          the infant, the court made permanent injunction restraining the publication or release of the names of
          the major persons and locations involved and the particulars of the abuse and requiring that each
          article published by the petitioners refer to the injunction."

In another B.C. case, Leung v. Leung, Chief Justice Esson (as he then was) held on the basis of the decision in Edmonton Journal that a party in a matrimonial proceeding was not entitled as of right to injunctive relief
restraining anyone other than those permitted by the rules to have access to the court file. In this regard, he stated in respect of the openness principle as follows (at pp. 310-311):

          "The application of the open court rule to interlocutory proceedings has been long established in this
          province, and may go back to the beginning of this court. In relation to court files, the approach of
          openness is recent but not a development peculiar to British Columbia. By 1985, when Pacific Press v.
          Vickers was decided, all Canadian courts were bound by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
          MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175. The specific issue in that case was
          the scope of access to specific documents filed on search warrant applications but its general reasoning
          and conclusions apply to all proceedings, criminal and civil. The division between the five members of
          the majority and the four of the minority arose directly on the question of whether the English approach
          of restricting access to protect privacy should continue to be followed in Canada. In deciding whether
          "openness" or the privacy interest of individuals should generally take precedence, openness thus was
          held to be the dominant value."

Chief Justice Esson went on to note (at p. 311), however, that "(i)t has, nevertheless, continued to be recognized that, because of the particular considerations relating to family law cases, the protection of privacy should take some precedence."

As should be clear from the foregoing, however, privacy considerations, alone, are not determinative. Madame
Justice Loo made this point clear in the recent case of K.V.P. v. T.E. In refusing to seal a family law file, she stated (at para. 20):

          "It therefore appears that notwithstanding Rule 60(22) [the predecessor rule to the current Rule
          60(41)], parties do not have a right to insist that the proceedings remain private, or that information
          contained in the files not be disclosed to persons other than the parties, or any solicitor in all
          circumstances. If a third party seeks access to a matrimonial file, a general desire to keep matters
          private or to avoid publicity is not sufficient to deny access. It appears that a significant risk that
          significant harm will otherwise occur must be demonstrated in order to overcome the openness
          principle and the majority decision in Edmonton Journal."

The Courts will also take into account whether or not the party seeking access is merely on a "fishing expedition."   For example, in Can. (A.G.) v. Warwick an income tax investigator applied under Rule 60(22) to search a divorce file to determine a party’s net worth and whether the income had been fully reported. The application was dismissed on the basis that it was a fishing expedition and other investigatory avenues had not been exhausted. Of note, however, the Court questioned whether privacy, on its own, was a sufficient ground to justify the exclusion of public scrutiny [see also Pesic v. Pesic (15 December 1993), Vancouver D072504 (B.C.S.C.), Esson C.J.S.C.].

V. ACCESS TO EXHIBITS

Access to exhibits is controlled by the courts. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1991
decision in Vickery v. Supreme Court (Nova Scotia) (Prothonotary).

In Vickery the court considered the media’s right to obtain access to audio and videotapes which were admitted in evidence in a criminal trial. At trial the accused was convicted but on appeal it was held that the evidence was inadmissible and the accused was acquitted.  The issue was whether the public should be entitled access to these tapes. The court had to balance the privacy interests of the accused with the fact that the tapes were made an exhibit at the trial and the trial was open to the public.  The trial judge granted the application and allowed a member of the public to obtain the tapes.  That decision was reversed on appeal, and an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed on the basis that, in the circumstances, the interests of the accused in keeping the exhibits private outweighed the media's right to access.

Speaking for the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Justice Stevenson stated (at p. 682) that

          "(w)hile they [exhibits] remain in its custody, the court has a duty to pass upon any request for access.
          That function is ordinarily exercised by its officers, such as the prothonotary (registrar) here, but the
          court having custody of the exhibits has supervision over their use."

He then stated (at pp. 682-83) that

          "(i)t follows that the court, as the custodian of the exhibits, is bound to inquire into the use that is to be
          made of them and, in my view, is fully entitled to regulate that use by securing appropriate
          undertakings and assurances if those be advisable to protect competing interests."

Mr. Justice Stevenson also listed the factors which should be considered by a hearing judge in determining whether the public or press should have access to exhibits.  The factors are as follows (at p. 681):

        a.The nature of exhibits as part of the court "record."
        b.The right of the court to inquire into the use to be made of access, and to regulate it.
        c.The fact that the exhibits were produced at trial and open to public scrutiny and discussion so that the
          open justice requirement had been met.
        d.That those subjected to judicial proceedings must undergo public scrutiny of what is said at trial or on
          appeal and contemporaneous discussion is protected, but different considerations may govern when the
          process is at an end and the discussion removed from the hearing context.

MacIntyre is also of assistance in respect of access to exhibits. In McIntyre Dickson J. stated (at p. 405):

          "Undoubtedly every Court has a supervisory and protecting power over its own records.  Access can
          be denied when the ends to justice would be subverted by disclosure or the judicial documents might be
          used for an improper purpose.  The presumption, however, is in favour of public access and the burden
          of contrary proof lies upon the person who would deny the exercise of the right.

Generally speaking, the exact nature of the procedures regarding requests for access to exhibits varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending on the direction of the local judiciary. For example, in British Columbia the
Practice Direction referred to above indicates that a request for access to an exhibit in a Supreme Court criminal matter must be referred to the trial judge or to the Chief Justice. In addition, exhibits can only be viewed under the supervision of registry staff.

Access to exhibits in B.C. Provincial Court matters, meanwhile, continues to be "guided" by CRMC 3/94, although Court Services Branch personnel have advised that the policy is in the process of being revised. Until that happens, it appears that the John case, noted above, would be of assistance in gaining access to exhibits, in circumstances where access is denied improperly by court staff.

A recent B.C. case illustrates the difficulty courts have in balancing the competing interests in respect of
applications for access to exhibits. In R. v. Glowatski a national newspaper sought access to autopsy photographs of an alleged murder victim. Although the accused took no position, the parents of the victim opposed the application, as did the Crown. After considering the principles outlined in both Dagenais and Vickery, Mr. Justice Macaulay dismissed the application, concluding that the family had a privacy interest in the autopsy photographs and that "severe psychological harm" would be caused if the application were granted. In support of his decision, he stated (at p. 2) that:

          "(N)either the media, nor the public enjoy a right of unrestricted access to exhibits. Access is always
          subject to the supervision of the court. The court must determine whether access can be accomplished
          in a manner that balances any competing Charter rights, including the right of an accused person to a
          fair trial, and, in this case, the legitimate privacy interest of the…family…. (A)ccess may be limited, or
          even denied, where the right of access for the purpose of publication conflicts with the fairness of the
          trial process or leads to harm to innocent parties."

Some examples of how Ontario courts have dealt with the question of access to exhibits include R. v. Bernardo and R. v. Arenburg. In the Bernardo case, after deciding that certain portions of videotape evidence to be presented at trial would not be played to the public gallery, Associate Chief Justice LeSage ruled (at para. 134) that when "the restricted videotapes are filed as an exhibit, the public, including the media, shall not have access to them until or unless there is a further order of the Court."

In R. v. Arenburg, however, the Court allowed the media access to a videotape of an interview with the accused conducted by a psychiatrist. In reaching its decision the court stated:

          "Although this clinical videotape is the property of Dr. Bradford, it was made with the consent of
          counsel for Mr. Arenburg.  Portions of the tape were played for the benefit of the jury and it was filed
          as an exhibit at the trial.  Any confidentiality which may have existed between Arenburg and Dr.
          Bradford was obviously waived once the tape was admitted into evidence.  Dr. Bradford still maintains
          a propriety interest in the videotape and the original will be returned to him in due course.  This does
          not prevent counsel or any other interested party from making copies of the exhibit."

In the Alberta case of Calgary Sun, a Division of Toronto Sun Publishing Corp. v. Alberta two newspapers sought access to, and authority to duplicate and to publish, extracts from trial exhibits in a murder trial.  The exhibits included photographs, letters, greeting cards, a 911 tape, x-rays and a patient care record. Both the Crown and the Defendant opposed the application on the grounds that the accused’s right to a fair trial would be infringed. The Court granted access subject to restrictions including that no broadcast or publication of any duplicate was permitted by the applicants until all proceedings against the accused and any appeal were finally concluded. The Court’s reasoning is summarized in the headnote as follows:

          "The question was whether the court was to allow the media to make photographic and other
          reproductions of exhibits for publication.  The court had a responsibility to ensure a fair trial and the
          integrity of exhibits and, as custodian of the exhibits, to protect ownership interests and the privacy
          interests of other persons not involved in the litigation.  The 911 tape was played in open court and the
          media had recorded the words. The applicants could not suggest that their rights to report had been
          denied.  The right to a fair trial was to be safeguarded.  A temporary delay protected that right and was
          a minimal infringement of any media rights.  No media ban resulted.  The media still had the
          opportunity to report on the proceedings and the exhibits’ content.  The denial of access neither
          affected the right of the public to know what the trial evidence was, nor the right and responsibility of
          the media to inform the public of the contents of the proceedings of the trial, including the nature and
          the content of the evidence presented."

In the Nova Scotia case of Halifax Herald Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) [re R. v. Barrow] the plaintiff
newspaper sought access to several exhibits which had been used in criminal trials that had been completed,
pursuant to that province’s Freedom of Information Act.  The Attorney General refused the request on the basis
the documents, which contained banking and financial information, fell within the definition of "personal
information" and were therefore prohibited from being disclosed unless certain conditions were met.  The subject of the exhibits, a prominent politician, intervened and sought a bar on their release and their return to him. After discussing the reasoning in both MacIntyre and Vickery the Court refused to grant access, stating that:

          "…ordering access to the four Exhibits would violate the principles set up in the Freedom of
          Information Act; it would disclose personal information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion
          of privacy contrary to s. 5(h).  I do not accept that there is no privacy left simply because certain
          information was once in the public domain.  The four Exhibits were produced at the two trials and
          subject to public scrutiny and discussion at the time therefore the requirement for open justice has been
          fulfilled (Vickery p. 193).  One must weigh Senator Barrow's privacy rights which as stated are not
          surrendered for all time (Vickery p. 194). In this case, providing access to the four Exhibits would
          violate his privacy rights which he regained as a result of an acquittal.  I have also quoted extensively
          from Vickery on the issue of non-contemporaneous public scrutiny and find that to allow access now
          could harm an innocent person and others and could amount to harassment, thus, the privacy interest
          outweighs any right of public accessibility."

As illustrated in the foregoing cases, a court’s discretion to grant access to exhibits is influenced to a great extent by the particular circumstances in each case, and allows for a variety of qualifications and restrictions [see also R. v. Ranger; R. v. Shearing; R. v. Warren].

With regard to young offender cases, access is governed by the Young Offenders Act. As mentioned, access to exhibits in Youth Court matters is restricted to Crown counsel, defence counsel and the youth, unless otherwise
ordered by the court. In addition, exhibits may only be viewed while under the supervision of registry personnel.

Access to exhibits in family matters, meanwhile, is governed by rules of procedure such as Rule 60(42) of the B.C. Rules of Court, which states:

          "The exhibits produced at the trial or hearing of a proceeding referred to in subrule (41) must be
          sealed by the registrar in a secure manner and, unless the court otherwise orders, no person other than
          a party’s solicitor, a party or a person authorized by a party or by a party’s solicitor, may search the
          exhibits."

Exhibits in non-family civil matters, meanwhile, are accessible upon request unless prohibited by statute or ordered sealed by the court.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

While the Courts have consistently emphasized the "openness" principle, there nevertheless, continues to be a
wide variety of restrictions, some of questionable validity, that impede the press in its efforts to report on matters before the Courts. It therefore goes without saying that journalists and their lawyers should familiarize themselves with the applicable laws and policies governing access to court files, and be prepared to argue their right to access whenever legitimate requests are thwarted.

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CASELAW

Attorney-General of Nova Scotia et al. v. MacIntyre (1982), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).

B.C. (A.G.) v. Pac. Press Ltd., [1988] 6 W.W.R. 536 (B.C.S.C.), Bouck J.

Calgary Sun, a Division of Toronto Sun Publishing Corp., [1996] A.J. No. 536 Q.L. Alta. Q.B.), Lutz J.

Can. (A.G.) v. Warwick (1989), 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 232 (S.C.), Boyd L.J.S.C.

Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.(1994), 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12 (S.C.C.).

Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney-General) (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.).

Forfeiture of Monies seized at the Pacific Highway Canada Customs Office (Re), [1995] B.C.J. No. 131 (Q.L.)
(S.C.),Thackray J. [In Chambers].

Halifax Herald Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) [re R. v. Barrow], [1992] N.S.J. No. 301 (N.S.S.C.), Glube C.J.T.D.

K.V.P. v. T.E., [1998] B.C.J. No. 1150 Q.L, (S.C.), Loo J.

Leung v. Leung (1993), 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 305 (S.C.), Esson C.J.S.C. [In Chambers].

R. v. Arenburg, [1997] O.J. No. 2386 Q.L. (Ont. Gen. Div.), Chadwick J.

R. v. Bernardo, [1995] O.J. No. 1472 Q.L. (Ont. Gen. Div.), LeSage A.C.J.O.C.

R. v. Glowatski (4 May 1999), Victoria 95773 (B.S.C.S.), Macaulay J.

R. v. John, [1996] B.C.J. No. 2535 Q.L. (B.C. Prov. Ct.), Saunderson Prov. Ct. J.

R. v. Ranger, [1998] O.J. No. 1654 Q.L. (Ont. Gen. Div.), Ewaschuk J.

R. v. Shearing, [1998] B.C.J. No. 1254 Q.L. (B.C.S.C.), Henderson J.

R. v. Warren, [1995] N.W.T.J. No. 9 Q.L. (N.W.T.S.C.), de Weerdt J.

Vickery v. Supreme Court (Nova Scotia) (Prothonotary), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 671.