"Access to pretrial documents furthers
the same societal needs served by open trials and pretrial civil and criminal
proceedings. Court officials can be better evaluated when their actions
are seen by informed, rather than merely curious, spectators."
[Anne Elizabeth Cohen, "Access to Pre Trial Documents Under the First Amendment" (1984), 84 Colum.L. Rev. 1813, at p. 1827.]
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the best potential sources of information
for journalists regarding matters before the courts are the court
files themselves. The problem is that,
despite the principle of "openness" lauded in case after case, access to
court files is often limited, either by statute or administrative "policy,"
to the lawyers, the parties involved and court staff. This paper will provide
a brief overview of four major areas in respect of access to court files:
access to search warrants, access to adult criminal files, access to family
law files, and access to exhibits.
II. ACCESS TO SEARCH WARRANTS
The issue of whether the public is entitled to inspect search warrants and the informations used to obtain them was dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney-General of Nova Scotia et al. v. MacIntyre.
In MacIntyre the Court laid down guidelines with respect to accessibility of search warrants and informations based on a number of policy considerations. The policy considerations included respect for the privacy of the individual, protection of the administration of justice, implementation of the will of Parliament that a search warrant be an effective aid in the investigation of crime, and the public’s interest in favour of openness in respect of judicial acts.
Based on the aforementioned considerations,
the Court in MacIntyre held that the public was not entitled to
be
present at the time a search warrant is
issued because of a concern that the effective administration of justice
would be frustrated, in part by the possibility
that the person whose premises were to be searched would be
forewarned. The Court also accepted that
where a search warrant is issued and executed but nothing is found
protection of the innocent from unnecessary
harm outweighed the public access interest. However, a majority of the
Court ruled that once a search warrant has been issued and executed resulting
in objects being found a member of the public was entitled to inspect a
warrant and the information upon which it was issued unless some overriding
interest required that access continue to be denied.
Regarding the issue of jurisdiction, the Court in MacIntyre held (at p. 405) that a publication ban could be granted pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction over its own process: "Undoubtedly every Court has a supervisory and protecting power over its own records. Access can be denied when the ends of justice would be subverted by disclosure or the judicial documents might be used for an improper purpose."
This power was qualified in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. In Dagenais the Supreme Court of Canada held that the discretionary power to limit publication, whether statutory or inherent, had to be exercised in accordance with the principles set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Since a publication ban, by definition, involves a s.2(b) infringement of the right to free speech, such bans had to be justified on the basis of competing and equally valid policy objectives. In Dagenais the Court said (at p. 38) that a publication ban should only be order when :
a. such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and,If the ban fails to meet this standard, then the judge making the order has committed an error of law. Generally
b. the salutary effects of the publication outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban.
Courts also consider the potential negative impact on third parties if a publication ban is not ordered in respect of a search warrant.
Generally speaking, such bans are usually lifted once the accused elects to be tried by judge alone, or once the jury is sequestered or begins its deliberations.
III. ACCESS TO CRIMINAL FILES
For the most part, adult criminal files are only open to inspection by the accused, his or her counsel, crown counsel assigned to that case, and anyone preparing a pre-sentence report at the request of the Court. There are exceptions.
In British Columbia, for example, a recent Practice Direction dated November 2, 1998 has clarified the exceptions, at least with respect to criminal matters before that province’s Supreme Court. Specifically, members of the public (which, of course, includes the media) have unrestricted access to Informations and Indictments when proffered and Reasons for Judgment. The public may also have access to search warrants and informations to obtain them where the search warrant has been executed, something has been seized, no claims for solicitor-client privilege or other statutory restrictions are involved, and a sealing order has not been made (see above). Interestingly, the Practice Direction specifically states that search warrants and informations to obtain them, if not issued under the Criminal Code or the Income Tax Act, are available for inspection even if nothing was seized, as long as no sealing order has been made.
The validity of a similar Practice Direction was discussed in the 1995 B.C. case of Forfeiture of Monies seized at the Pacific Highway Canada Customs Office (Re). In that case newspapers sought access to the court’s file to use affidavit material, namely those of investigating police officers, in their stories. In granting access, the Court had the opportunity to comment on a submission by one of the media applicants to the effect that the Practice Direction infringed s. 2(b) of the Charter. According to Mr. Justice Thackery (at paras. 37 - 38):
" With respect, the Direction does not deny access to the vast majority
of documents. It provides a
straight- forward procedure to enable the court to discharge its obligation
to exercise what Dickson J.
in MacIntyre at p. 405 describes as a "supervisory and protecting
power over its own records." It
provides for unrestricted access to informations, indictments and reasons
for judgment and for access
to search warrants in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 and, in all
other cases, for an informal
written request to the trial judge or the Chief Justice through the registry.
The request is often granted
at that point without anything further. If it is not clear that the
request would not affect anyone’s
legitimate interest, notice may have to be given to Crown counsel, the
accused, or others who may be
affected. In the few cases where there remains an issue, an application
involving a hearing may be
required.
The submission that the Practice Direction is "over-inclusive and invalid"
is not, in my opinion, a viable
argument. The Practice Direction does not violate any principle of
common law. Nor does it curtail
public access to the records of the judicial process to the extent that
any case can be made out of a
Charter violation."
With respect to matters in B.C. Provincial
Court, the Ministry of the Attorney-General has issued a "Court
Services Circular" [CRMC 3/94] which outlines
the general policy to be followed by court staff with respect to
document disclosure. The validity of this
circular, as will be discussed below, is questionable. In any event, the
circular purports to be a "quick reference
for court staff which can provide guidance for situations where caution
must be exercised…." It does not apply to
Youth Court or Supreme Court matters. Subject to exceptions the policy
states that the public and the media should be given access to the following
information in criminal matters in Provincial Court:
a.name of accused (unless prohibited by court order);
b.specific charges or proceedings contained in the Information;
c.notice of appeal;
d.information concerning adjournment dates;
e.the final disposition;
f.reasons for judgment, if on file, and not restricted by court order or
otherwise.
The public or the media are also given access to the:
a.Record of Proceedings;
b.Case History Card;
c.Adjournment Minutes Sheet (automated registries).
The circular then goes on to list all the documents that have restricted access. Such restricted documents include applications for wire-taps (no access – s. 187 Criminal Code), the accused’s criminal record (access only to Crown counsel, defence counsel, accused and probation officer concerned with the case), and medical reports (access only to Crown counsel, accused, defence counsel and the probation officer assigned to the matter, unless otherwise ordered by the Court).
The validity of CRMC 3/94, however, was
brought into question in the case of R. v. John. In John a local
reporter asked for access to a transcript
of a tape recorded statement given by the accused in order to confirm the
statements attributed to the accused. Although
the tape recording was played in court in the presence of the reporter
he had some difficulty hearing what was said and was concerned about relying
on his notes. Upon his
request the Court’s attention was drawn
to the aforementioned policy circular. Specifically, the Court focused
on the restriction regarding exhibits
which limited access to Crown counsel, defence counsel and accused, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court. In addition,
exhibits could only be viewed while under the supervision of registry
personnel. In finding the policy of no force
and effect, Judge Saunderson referred to the restriction regarding
exhibits and stated as follows (at p.
8):
"That statement reverses the presumption of openness of the courts and
access by the public and the
media to evidence. Clearly, there must be some control and protection of
exhibits and therefore
members of the public and the media will have to make arrangements with
the court staff if they wish to
view certain types of exhibits, for example, firearms, narcotics and other
objects. I do not regard a
written exhibit as an object.
To the extent that this Court Services circular reverses the burden in
respect of access to the
information in question, namely copies of written exhibits, it, in my view,
is of no force and effect
whatsoever and the court staff ought not to be guided by it. If the Attorney
General wishes to take
issue with that, he can do so. Presumably now it will be in another court."
As a result, Judge Saunderson granted the reporter’s request and provided him with a copy of the transcript of the tape recording.
Another problem with CRMC 3/94 is that
it is woefully out-of-date, owing to changes in the names of some court
documents. Although it continues in effect,
a re-working of the entire BC Criminal Case Processing Manual is
underway. It is expected that changes
will include a new chapter dealing with access issues.
Regarding Youth Court matters, the general
rule (as noted in CRMC 3/94) is that nothing can be disclosed or
released which connects the young person
to the offence. While court lists may contain the young person’s name,
they cannot reveal the charge. In addition,
the Young Offenders Act stipulates that access to youth court
documents is given to the youth, probation
officer, defence counsel, Crown counsel, parent or adult assisting the
youth, or the person specified in a court
order or in s. 44.1 of the Young Offenders Act as restricted by s. 45.
IV. ACCESS TO FAMILY LAW FILES
It has long been recognized that court files in divorce and other family law proceedings require special protection. The various jurisdictions have, therefore, established rules regarding disclosure and access in family matters before the courts. For example, Rule 60(41) of the B.C. Rules of Court states:
"Unless the court otherwise orders, no person, other than a solicitor,
a party or a person authorized by
a party or by a party’s solicitor, may search a registry file in respect
of a proceeding brought under the
Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8, the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd
Supp.), the Family Relations
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128, or the Child, Family and Community Services
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46."
Of note, Reasons for Judgment are not considered part of the court file, even though a copy may be kept there, and are therefore available to the public and the media, usually upon payment of a fee.
Some of the rules restricting access to family court files, however, have been brought into question. For example, in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney-General) the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a section of the Alberta Judicature Act which had placed substantial restrictions upon access to family law proceedings and files, and upon the right to publish details of those proceedings and files. The majority of the Court held that openness was to be the rule in these matters, but that this rule was subject to exceptions, including the need for protection of privacy of witnesses or children. According to Mr. Justice Cory (at p. 617) "there can be no doubt that in order to ensure a fair trial and to protect privacy interests, the court can always use its supervisory power over its own record to grant restraining orders in appropriate cases."
An interesting case in this regard is the B.C. case of Pacific Press Ltd. v. Vickers & Palmer. In Vickers the Court ordered a family file unsealed but placed restrictions on the publication of certain information. The Court’s reasoning was summarized in the headnote (at p. 92) as follows:
"The right of the public to know about the conduct of the government in
matters of custody takes
precedence over the interest of the infant in his or her privacy, particularly
where the matter in
question has been completed. The court file was ordered unsealed. However,
to protect the privacy of
the infant, the court made permanent injunction restraining the publication
or release of the names of
the major persons and locations involved and the particulars of the abuse
and requiring that each
article published by the petitioners refer to the injunction."
In another B.C. case, Leung v. Leung,
Chief Justice Esson (as he then was) held on the basis of the decision
in Edmonton Journal that a party in
a matrimonial proceeding was not entitled as of right to injunctive relief
restraining anyone other than those permitted
by the rules to have access to the court file. In this regard, he stated
in respect of the openness principle as follows
(at pp. 310-311):
"The application of the open court rule to interlocutory proceedings has
been long established in this
province, and may go back to the beginning of this court. In relation to
court files, the approach of
openness is recent but not a development peculiar to British Columbia.
By 1985, when Pacific Press v.
Vickers was decided, all Canadian courts were bound by the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision in
MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175.
The specific issue in that case was
the scope of access to specific documents filed on search warrant applications
but its general reasoning
and conclusions apply to all proceedings, criminal and civil. The division
between the five members of
the majority and the four of the minority arose directly on the question
of whether the English approach
of restricting access to protect privacy should continue to be followed
in Canada. In deciding whether
"openness" or the privacy interest of individuals should generally take
precedence, openness thus was
held to be the dominant value."
Chief Justice Esson went on to note (at p. 311), however, that "(i)t has, nevertheless, continued to be recognized that, because of the particular considerations relating to family law cases, the protection of privacy should take some precedence."
As should be clear from the foregoing,
however, privacy considerations, alone, are not determinative. Madame
Justice Loo made this point clear in the
recent case of K.V.P. v. T.E. In refusing to seal a family law file,
she stated (at para. 20):
"It therefore appears that notwithstanding Rule 60(22) [the predecessor
rule to the current Rule
60(41)], parties do not have a right to insist that the proceedings remain
private, or that information
contained in the files not be disclosed to persons other than the parties,
or any solicitor in all
circumstances. If a third party seeks access to a matrimonial file, a general
desire to keep matters
private or to avoid publicity is not sufficient to deny access. It appears
that a significant risk that
significant harm will otherwise occur must be demonstrated in order to
overcome the openness
principle and the majority decision in Edmonton Journal."
The Courts will also take into account whether or not the party seeking access is merely on a "fishing expedition." For example, in Can. (A.G.) v. Warwick an income tax investigator applied under Rule 60(22) to search a divorce file to determine a party’s net worth and whether the income had been fully reported. The application was dismissed on the basis that it was a fishing expedition and other investigatory avenues had not been exhausted. Of note, however, the Court questioned whether privacy, on its own, was a sufficient ground to justify the exclusion of public scrutiny [see also Pesic v. Pesic (15 December 1993), Vancouver D072504 (B.C.S.C.), Esson C.J.S.C.].
V. ACCESS TO EXHIBITS
Access to exhibits is controlled by the
courts. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1991
decision in Vickery v. Supreme Court
(Nova Scotia) (Prothonotary).
In Vickery the court considered the media’s right to obtain access to audio and videotapes which were admitted in evidence in a criminal trial. At trial the accused was convicted but on appeal it was held that the evidence was inadmissible and the accused was acquitted. The issue was whether the public should be entitled access to these tapes. The court had to balance the privacy interests of the accused with the fact that the tapes were made an exhibit at the trial and the trial was open to the public. The trial judge granted the application and allowed a member of the public to obtain the tapes. That decision was reversed on appeal, and an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed on the basis that, in the circumstances, the interests of the accused in keeping the exhibits private outweighed the media's right to access.
Speaking for the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Justice Stevenson stated (at p. 682) that
"(w)hile they [exhibits] remain in its custody, the court has a duty to
pass upon any request for access.
That function is ordinarily exercised by its officers, such as the prothonotary
(registrar) here, but the
court having custody of the exhibits has supervision over their use."
He then stated (at pp. 682-83) that
"(i)t follows that the court, as the custodian of the exhibits, is bound
to inquire into the use that is to be
made of them and, in my view, is fully entitled to regulate that use by
securing appropriate
undertakings and assurances if those be advisable to protect competing
interests."
Mr. Justice Stevenson also listed the factors which should be considered by a hearing judge in determining whether the public or press should have access to exhibits. The factors are as follows (at p. 681):
a.The nature of exhibits as part of the court "record."
b.The right of the court to inquire into the use to be made of access,
and to regulate it.
c.The fact that the exhibits were produced at trial and open to public
scrutiny and discussion so that the
open justice requirement had been met.
d.That those subjected to judicial proceedings must undergo public scrutiny
of what is said at trial or on
appeal and contemporaneous discussion is protected, but different considerations
may govern when the
process is at an end and the discussion removed from the hearing context.
MacIntyre is also of assistance in respect of access to exhibits. In McIntyre Dickson J. stated (at p. 405):
"Undoubtedly every Court has a supervisory and protecting power over its
own records. Access can
be denied when the ends to justice would be subverted by disclosure or
the judicial documents might be
used for an improper purpose. The presumption, however, is in favour
of public access and the burden
of contrary proof lies upon the person who would deny the exercise of the
right.
Generally speaking, the exact nature of
the procedures regarding requests for access to exhibits varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending
on the direction of the local judiciary. For example, in British Columbia
the
Practice Direction referred to above indicates
that a request for access to an exhibit in a Supreme Court criminal
matter must be referred to the trial judge
or to the Chief Justice. In addition, exhibits can only be viewed under
the supervision of registry staff.
Access to exhibits in B.C. Provincial Court matters, meanwhile, continues to be "guided" by CRMC 3/94, although Court Services Branch personnel have advised that the policy is in the process of being revised. Until that happens, it appears that the John case, noted above, would be of assistance in gaining access to exhibits, in circumstances where access is denied improperly by court staff.
A recent B.C. case illustrates the difficulty
courts have in balancing the competing interests in respect of
applications for access to exhibits. In
R. v. Glowatski a national newspaper sought access to autopsy photographs
of an alleged murder victim. Although the
accused took no position, the parents of the victim opposed the
application, as did the Crown. After considering
the principles outlined in both Dagenais and Vickery, Mr.
Justice Macaulay dismissed the application, concluding that the family
had a privacy interest in the autopsy photographs and that "severe psychological
harm" would be caused if the application were granted. In support of his
decision, he stated (at p. 2) that:
"(N)either the media, nor the public enjoy a right of unrestricted access
to exhibits. Access is always
subject to the supervision of the court. The court must determine whether
access can be accomplished
in a manner that balances any competing Charter rights, including the right
of an accused person to a
fair trial, and, in this case, the legitimate privacy interest of the…family….
(A)ccess may be limited, or
even denied, where the right of access for the purpose of publication conflicts
with the fairness of the
trial process or leads to harm to innocent parties."
Some examples of how Ontario courts have dealt with the question of access to exhibits include R. v. Bernardo and R. v. Arenburg. In the Bernardo case, after deciding that certain portions of videotape evidence to be presented at trial would not be played to the public gallery, Associate Chief Justice LeSage ruled (at para. 134) that when "the restricted videotapes are filed as an exhibit, the public, including the media, shall not have access to them until or unless there is a further order of the Court."
In R. v. Arenburg, however, the Court allowed the media access to a videotape of an interview with the accused conducted by a psychiatrist. In reaching its decision the court stated:
"Although this clinical videotape is the property of Dr. Bradford, it was
made with the consent of
counsel for Mr. Arenburg. Portions of the tape were played for the
benefit of the jury and it was filed
as an exhibit at the trial. Any confidentiality which may have existed
between Arenburg and Dr.
Bradford was obviously waived once the tape was admitted into evidence.
Dr. Bradford still maintains
a propriety interest in the videotape and the original will be returned
to him in due course. This does
not prevent counsel or any other interested party from making copies of
the exhibit."
In the Alberta case of Calgary Sun, a Division of Toronto Sun Publishing Corp. v. Alberta two newspapers sought access to, and authority to duplicate and to publish, extracts from trial exhibits in a murder trial. The exhibits included photographs, letters, greeting cards, a 911 tape, x-rays and a patient care record. Both the Crown and the Defendant opposed the application on the grounds that the accused’s right to a fair trial would be infringed. The Court granted access subject to restrictions including that no broadcast or publication of any duplicate was permitted by the applicants until all proceedings against the accused and any appeal were finally concluded. The Court’s reasoning is summarized in the headnote as follows:
"The question was whether the court was to allow the media to make photographic
and other
reproductions of exhibits for publication. The court had a responsibility
to ensure a fair trial and the
integrity of exhibits and, as custodian of the exhibits, to protect ownership
interests and the privacy
interests of other persons not involved in the litigation. The 911
tape was played in open court and the
media had recorded the words. The applicants could not suggest that their
rights to report had been
denied. The right to a fair trial was to be safeguarded. A
temporary delay protected that right and was
a minimal infringement of any media rights. No media ban resulted.
The media still had the
opportunity to report on the proceedings and the exhibits’ content.
The denial of access neither
affected the right of the public to know what the trial evidence was, nor
the right and responsibility of
the media to inform the public of the contents of the proceedings of the
trial, including the nature and
the content of the evidence presented."
In the Nova Scotia case of Halifax Herald
Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) [re R. v. Barrow] the plaintiff
newspaper sought access to several exhibits
which had been used in criminal trials that had been completed,
pursuant to that province’s Freedom of
Information Act. The Attorney General refused the request on the
basis
the documents, which contained banking
and financial information, fell within the definition of "personal
information" and were therefore prohibited
from being disclosed unless certain conditions were met. The subject
of the exhibits, a prominent politician,
intervened and sought a bar on their release and their return to him. After
discussing the reasoning in both MacIntyre
and Vickery the Court refused to grant access, stating that:
"…ordering access to the four Exhibits would violate the principles set
up in the Freedom of
Information Act; it would disclose personal information which would constitute
an unwarranted invasion
of privacy contrary to s. 5(h). I do not accept that there is no
privacy left simply because certain
information was once in the public domain. The four Exhibits were
produced at the two trials and
subject to public scrutiny and discussion at the time therefore the requirement
for open justice has been
fulfilled (Vickery p. 193). One must weigh Senator Barrow's
privacy rights which as stated are not
surrendered for all time (Vickery p. 194). In this case, providing
access to the four Exhibits would
violate his privacy rights which he regained as a result of an acquittal.
I have also quoted extensively
from Vickery on the issue of non-contemporaneous public scrutiny
and find that to allow access now
could harm an innocent person and others and could amount to harassment,
thus, the privacy interest
outweighs any right of public accessibility."
As illustrated in the foregoing cases, a court’s discretion to grant access to exhibits is influenced to a great extent by the particular circumstances in each case, and allows for a variety of qualifications and restrictions [see also R. v. Ranger; R. v. Shearing; R. v. Warren].
With regard to young offender cases, access
is governed by the Young Offenders Act. As mentioned, access to exhibits
in Youth Court matters is restricted to Crown counsel, defence counsel
and the youth, unless otherwise
ordered by the court. In addition, exhibits
may only be viewed while under the supervision of registry personnel.
Access to exhibits in family matters, meanwhile, is governed by rules of procedure such as Rule 60(42) of the B.C. Rules of Court, which states:
"The exhibits produced at the trial or hearing of a proceeding referred
to in subrule (41) must be
sealed by the registrar in a secure manner and, unless the court otherwise
orders, no person other than
a party’s solicitor, a party or a person authorized by a party or by a
party’s solicitor, may search the
exhibits."
Exhibits in non-family civil matters, meanwhile, are accessible upon request unless prohibited by statute or ordered sealed by the court.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While the Courts have consistently emphasized
the "openness" principle, there nevertheless, continues to be a
wide variety of restrictions, some of
questionable validity, that impede the press in its efforts to report on
matters before the Courts. It therefore
goes without saying that journalists and their lawyers should familiarize
themselves with the applicable laws and policies governing access to court
files, and be prepared to argue their right to access whenever legitimate
requests are thwarted.
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CASELAW
Attorney-General of Nova Scotia et al. v. MacIntyre (1982), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
B.C. (A.G.) v. Pac. Press Ltd., [1988] 6 W.W.R. 536 (B.C.S.C.), Bouck J.
Calgary Sun, a Division of Toronto Sun Publishing Corp., [1996] A.J. No. 536 Q.L. Alta. Q.B.), Lutz J.
Can. (A.G.) v. Warwick (1989), 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 232 (S.C.), Boyd L.J.S.C.
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.(1994), 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12 (S.C.C.).
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney-General) (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.).
Forfeiture of Monies seized at the Pacific
Highway Canada Customs Office (Re), [1995] B.C.J. No. 131 (Q.L.)
(S.C.),Thackray J. [In Chambers].
Halifax Herald Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) [re R. v. Barrow], [1992] N.S.J. No. 301 (N.S.S.C.), Glube C.J.T.D.
K.V.P. v. T.E., [1998] B.C.J. No. 1150 Q.L, (S.C.), Loo J.
Leung v. Leung (1993), 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 305 (S.C.), Esson C.J.S.C. [In Chambers].
R. v. Arenburg, [1997] O.J. No. 2386 Q.L. (Ont. Gen. Div.), Chadwick J.
R. v. Bernardo, [1995] O.J. No. 1472 Q.L. (Ont. Gen. Div.), LeSage A.C.J.O.C.
R. v. Glowatski (4 May 1999), Victoria 95773 (B.S.C.S.), Macaulay J.
R. v. John, [1996] B.C.J. No. 2535 Q.L. (B.C. Prov. Ct.), Saunderson Prov. Ct. J.
R. v. Ranger, [1998] O.J. No. 1654 Q.L. (Ont. Gen. Div.), Ewaschuk J.
R. v. Shearing, [1998] B.C.J. No. 1254 Q.L. (B.C.S.C.), Henderson J.
R. v. Warren, [1995] N.W.T.J. No. 9 Q.L. (N.W.T.S.C.), de Weerdt J.
Vickery v. Supreme Court (Nova Scotia)
(Prothonotary), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 671.