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Electronic Public Access to Court

British Columbia

On December 2, 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada surprised everyone in the Clark appeal by agreeing to a motion by the lawyer for Mr. Pilarinos that the appeal was now moot. When the case was first brought to the Court, it held that an expedited hearing could not be held as the trial was getting close. Then, granting leave to appeal, it scheduled the appeal for a date after the trial had to be over. After factums were filed, and six weeks before the hearing date, they pulled the plug. It's hard to read between the lines when there are so few lines to read between.

On January 17, 2002 the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal the decision of the trial judge in R. v. Clark not to permit television camera access to the trial proceedings. The hearing is scheduled for January 14, 2003. The media's appeal factum is a compelling argument.

On September 24, the trial court in R. v. Clark dismissed the application of the national and local media to televise the trial. Within a week, a media coalition sought leave to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada on an expedited basis, but the Arbour J. ruled that the Court would not expedite the application because that would interfere with the defendants' preparation for trial.

The trial court's ruling holds that, while there is a s.2(b) right to gather news, there is no right under that section to record court proceedings for transmission to the public. It makes one wonder what the words in that section "freedom of the press and other media of communication" mean. The court finds that the studies on the effects of camera coverage are "inconclusive", yet holds that not knowing the effect is sufficient reason to keep the camera out to preserve the right of fair trial. The court concludes that experimentation is the best way to proceed, and, not surprisingly, supports the approach of the BC Supreme Court in that regard. Among the findings that are troubling:

  • filming is not expressive activity (contrary to the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Butler)
  • a restriction on filming is not a publication ban, subject to the analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dagenais v. CBC
  • restricting filming in court does not infringe s. 2(b) (contrary to the Ontario Court of Appeal ruling in R. v. Squires)
  • courts are not places "of public debate aimed at promoting the truth"
  • the public will get "much less information on television than they presently get in the newspaper coverage" (this despite evidence that the entire proceedings would be made available to the public on the new CourtTV digital channel and the internet, as well as
    extensively on CBC Newsworld), and
  • there is a right to privacy in court which, presumably, applies in the circumstances to a former Premier and his conduct while in office.

In April, the B.C. Supreme Court announced the adoption of a policy permitting camera access to courts on consent. In R. v. Clark, the former Premier denied his consent. The B.C. Attorney General opposed the media's application, and, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court retained a lawyer of its own in this case to defend its policy position.

A detailed paper expanding upon the court's policy is online. Unbelievably, the paper sets out, among other things, "the view of the court that the public educational and informational value of media-driven camera access is dubious at best." It is disappointing, to say the least, coming from a body whose members are regularly called upon to rule on cases involving that very right, e.g. R. v. Clark.

The Supreme Court has developed guidelines to be used for television access applications.

Ad IDEM was one of the media applicants in R. v. Clark. Its position is that the Charter of Rights mandates camera access unless compelling evidence exists to suppress it. Consent, as a precondition to camera access, is inconsistent with public access to court. A public proceeding that is not harmed by camera coverage should not be rendered inaccessible to the public at large on the basis that such coverage does not fit into the public relations strategy of a party denying consent. In the Squires case, the issue was television camera access to court, and the Crown denied its consent to television coverage there. A consent requirement in B.C. last year would have prevented the successful television coverage of the Cho case. In Ontario, where there has been a statutory consent provision since 1974, there has been little television coverage of courts.

See also: Electronic Public Access to Court - Background

 



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